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Faculty and Deans

INVESTIGATORY PRACTICES AND THE
CHANGING ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE *
Paul Marcus**
Introduction
For decades, serious disagreements were heard concerning the basis for
the entrapment defense, the two principal tests, and the manner in which the
tests should be applied. The broad debate regarding entrapment as a way to
extend judicial control over law enforcement behavior has essentially disappeared,t even at the United States Supreme Court. 2 Most jurisdictions in our
country have adopted a view of the defense which looks mainly to the
culpability of the individual defendant rather than the conduct of government officers.3 With this prevailing subjective approach,· judges and juries5
ask whether the defendant committed the criminal action in response to sufficient inducement by the government, and whether- prior to government

* (c) 2000 Paul Marcus.
** Haynes Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.
1 The debate had been vigorous among Justices of the Supreme Court as well as
academics and practicing lawyers. See, for instance, the comments of Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958),
and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 ( 1973).
2 Justice Brennan was the last holdout arguing for a change in the standard for
entrapment. He gave up in Mathews v. United States. 485 U.S . 58, 67 (1988) where
he remarked:

I join the Court ' s opinion. I write separately only because I have previously joined or
written four opinions dissenting from this Court's holdings that the defendant's predisposition is relevant to the entrapment defense. Although some governmental misconduct
might be sufficiently egregious to violate due process, my differences with the Court have
been based on statutory interpretation and federal common law, not on the Constitution.
Were I judging on a clean slate, I would still be inclined to adopt the view that the entrapment defense should focus exclusively on the Government's conduct. But I am not writing
on a clean slate; the Court has spoken definitively on this point. Therefore I bow to stare
decisis, and today join the judgment and reasoning of the Court.
S Most, but not all , jurisdictions use this " subjective approach. " Some large
states such as Ca lifornia, Texas and Michigan principally review the actions of the
government agents, under the so-called "objective approach" to entrapment. Minnesota, Pennsylvania and New Mexico have adopted tests which combine the two
approaches. For analysis of the various state views, see, Marcus, Th e Entrapment
Def ense (The Michie Co., 2nd Ed. 1995).
• The federal courts and about two-thirds of the state courts use this test.
5 Normally the question is one for juries unless a finding can be made as a matter
of law. See infra note 18.
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contacr' - that person was "predisposed " toward this sort of criminal action.'
The United States Supreme Court has spoken in depth about the entrapment defense on several occasions settling many of the earlier disputes. 8
Some of the key issues surrounding the defense have not, however, gone
away. Substantial practical problems remain in applying the defense in the
context of an enormous number of law enforcement undercover operations
and "stings,"9 seen in an incredible array of factual settings.lO
6 The timing of the inquiry had been open to disagreement until the Jacobson decision, infra. It is now beyond dispute that the inquiry is to concentrate on the period
before the initial approach by the law enforcement agent, as opposed to the time of
the later solicitation. The difference can be substantial, as in Jacobson. There the defendant was engaged by the government for a period of more than two years before
any solicitation was made.
, Deciding whether the defendant was predisposed can be difficult. Most courts
follow a "totality of circumstances" approach. See, e.g., United States v. McClelland, 72 F .3d 717, 722 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 1 16 S. Ct. 1448 (1996):

Predisposition is established only after analyzing five factors: I) the character and reputation of the defendant; 2) whether the government made the initial suggestion of criminal activity; 3) whether the defendant engaged in the activity for profit; 4) whether the defendant showed any reluctance; and 5) the nature of the government's inducement.
S Disputes, for instance, as to whether the government's sale/purchase back of an
illegal substance is necessarily entrapment-Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S.
484 (1976)-and whether inconsistent defenses must be barred in the entrapment
setting- Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988). The answer to both questions is " no. "
9 In just the last several years, long term undercover investigations have been created with these catchy names:
- Operation Casablanca
- Operation Lost Trust
- Wonderland Club Sting
- Operation Clean
- Operation Seek and Keep
- Project Exile
- Operation Tree Surgeon
- Crown Casting Company Operation
- Operation Ramp Rat
- Operation Bright and Shiny
- False Flag Operation
- Operation Double Barrel
- Operation Norlock
- The Dirty Three Operation
Media coverage of these investigations is on file with the author.
10 Over these past same years, undercover operations have been designed to
combat, among many others, these crimes:
- alien smuggling
- blackmail
- theft of computer chips, golf clubs, sports rings, wiring
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Much has been written regarding the rationale for the entrapment defense
and the policies behind the various approaches.11 This essay is not the venue
for a reconsideration of such matters. Nor am I interested now in encouraging a very different view of the defense, particularly in light of the Chief
Justice's frequent reminder that entrapment is "a relatively limited
- dog fighting
- indecent exposure
- extortion
- fraud in a host of areas such as tax, food stamp, insurance, securities, telemarketing, police crime labs, voter registration, and government contracts
- illegal militia activities
- sale of illegal meat
- garbage hauling cartels
- unlawful dispensing of drugs
- robbery
- assault
- battery
- political corruption
- unlawful wildlife purchases
- bombing
- assassination
- sale of illegal weapons
- money laundering
- child pornography, child molestation
- drug trafficking
- murder
- outstanding felony warrants
- prostitution
- price fixing (for bread, chemicals, com syrup)
- graffiti
- bribery

- rape
- medical insurance kickbacks.
The subjects of these stings have been a rich assortment of citizenry including
judges, doctors, lawyers, F.B.I. agents, business leaders, pharmacists, police officers, teachers, school principals, chemists, athletes, clergy, movie stars, elected officials, and bakers. Here, too, media coverage of these investigations is on file with
the author.
11 See, e.g., Lord, " Entrapment and Due Process: Moving Toward a Dual System
of Defenses," 25 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 463 , 517 (1998); Marcus, " Presenting, Back
From the [Almost] Dead, The Entrapment Defense," 47 Fla. L. Rev. 205 (1995);
Camp, " Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United States : Towards a More Balanced Entrapment Standard," 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology lOSS , 1096-97 (1993);
Bennett, "From Sorrells to Jacobson : Reflections on Six Decades of Entrapment
Law, and Related Defenses, in Federal Court," 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 829 ( 1992);
Carlson, "The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense,"
73 Va. L. Rev . 10 II (1987); Groot, " The Serpent Beguiled Me and I (Without
Scienter) Did Eat-Denial of Crime and Entrapment Defense," 1973 U. III. L. Rev.
254 (1973); Park, "The E ntrapment Controversy, " 60 Minn. L. Rev. 163 (1976).
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defense.' , 12 But, in viewing the manner in which the defense is raised
throughout our country, I am struck by the presence of genuine change in
one important area. This change is certainly worthy of note.

The Evolving Process
The most recent entrapment opinion from the Supreme Court provides a
strong impetus for the development taking place. In Jacobson v. United
States,13 the Court was faced with an egregious sting operation in which
undercover postal investigators targeted an individual with no prior record. 14
They conducted a lengthy campaign of personal contacts with him,15 and the
agents emphasized to him- in this child pornography case-the importance
of supporting strong freedom of speech considerations under the First
Amendment. 18 The defendant raised an entrapment defense, but was
convicted of receiving obscene materials through the mail, materials sent to
him by the postal inspectors soon after they asked him to order the items!7
The Court, in reversing the conviction, went well beyond expressing displeasure with the somewhat unusual law enforcement initiative. Instead, the
Court found entrapment as a matter of law l8 and spoke strongly of the
government's behavior.
Had the agents in this case simply offered petitioner the opportunity to
order child pornography through the mails, and petitioner- who must be
presumed to know the law- had promptly availed himself of this criminal
opportunity, it is unlikely that his entrapment defense would have warranted a jury instruction.
But that is not what happen ed here. By the time petitioner finally
placed his order, he had already been the target of 26 months of repeated
mailings and communications from Government agents and fictitious
organizations.... .
Law enforcement officials go too far when they "implant in the mind of
an innocent per on the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce
its commission in order that they may prosecute."ID

Sorting out the meaning of the decision has not been easy for judges and
lawyers. But change, important change, based on that decision is surely occurring. Perhaps the leading judicial assertion of a broad reading of JacobUnited States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 , 435 (1973).
503 U.S. 540 (1992).
14 The agents had been alerted to him as a result of a raid of a bookstore which
sold sexually explicit magazines (but not then deemed obscene). Id. at 543.
15 rd. at 543-47.
18 Id. at 544-45.
17
18 U.S.c. § 2252(a)(2)(A) [a section of the Child Protection Act of 1984].
18 A claim of entrapment as a matter of law requires the defendant to show that
"there is undisputed testimony which shows conclusively and unmistakably that an
otherwise innocent person was induced to commit the act." United States v. Duran,
133 F.3d 1324, 1335 (10th Cir. 1998).
19
503 U.S. at 550, 553.
12

13
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son is Judge Posner's opinion for the en bane Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Hollingsworth. 20 There, in a case involving two arnateurs 21 caught
up in a government sponsored money laundering scheme, the majority held
that the proper question regarding predisposition is not simply whether the
defendants were eager and quick in response to the government inducement. 22 Rather, the courts should determine if the defendants would have
committed the crime without the government involvement. This determination emphasizes much more substantially a causal link between the
defendant's state of mind, the government inducement, and the ultimate
cnme.
[T]he Court [in J acobson] clarified the mea ning of pred isposition.
Predisposition is not a purely mental state, the state of being willing to
swallow the government's bait. It has positiona l as well as dispositional
force. The dictio nary definitions of the word include "tendency" as well as
" inclination. " The defendant must be so situated by reason of previous
training or ex perience or occupation or acq uaintances that it is likely that
if the government had not induced him to commit the crime some criminal would have done so; o nl y then does a sting or other arranged crime
ta ke a dangerous person o ut of circulation.23

I have written before, in praise of Hollingsworth,24 arguing that it correctly applied Jacobson , and urging other courts to follow the lead of the
Seventh Circuit. 25 Not taking into account the likelihood of the crime without
government involvement is both a distortion of the entrapment defense and a
disservice to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. After all,
if the defendant never would have committed the crime without government
20

27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994) [en banc).
One a dentist, the other a farmer. "Tyros," in the court's parlance. Id. at 1203.
22 Often courts equate predisposition with enthusiasm, or even a lack of hesitation . See, e.g., United States v. Dozal-Bencomo, 952 F.2d 1246, 1251 ( lOth Cir.
1991), (indicating that predisposition may be inferred from defendant's' 'eagerness
to participate in the transaction, his ready response to the government's inducement
offer .. . "). Of course, in Jacobson, the defendant did not hesitate in response to
the ultimate solicitation. Still, the Court found entrapment as a matter of law, as the
solicitation occurred more than two years after the first contact with him.
23
27 F.3d at 1200.
24 See Marcus, supra, note II .
21

25

Wi th long-term investigations, intensive operations, or tremendous incentives to commi t crime being offered, government investigators ought to be able to point to more than a
willingness, or even an eagerness, on the part of the defendant to participate in the crime.
Instead, the prosecution must show that even wi thout the government involvement the
person would have been likely to commit a crime in the foreseeable future. This result
strikes the proper balance between careful investigation by the government, and the creation of unlawful behavior.

Td., 47 Fla. L. Rev. at 245.
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inducement, why is this person being prosecuted, why are valuable public
resources being utilized?26
Few judges have chosen to rely on the "positional" approach of Hollingsworth. 27 Still, even in those courts which have not embraced this rationale, movement toward a much stronger use of the entrapment defense can
be seen. The Ninth Circuit experience is illustrative. In its first major decision after Jacobson, the court could not find that the view of the Seventh
Circuit was consistent with the Supreme Court's entrapment jurisprudence.
Relying on Hollingsworth , Thickstun interprets J acobson to hold that a
defendant not only must inte nd to break the law but must be " ready" to
do so prior to government contact. If she desires to commit a crime but
lacks the means to accomplish it, and a government agent subsequently
supplies those mea ns, unde r T hickstun 's reading of Jacobson, she was
entrapped .
We read J acobson not as creating a requirement of positional readiness
but as a pplyin g settled e ntrapment la w. The inference that the
government's methods had persuaded an otherwise law-abiding citizen to
break the law, coupled with the absence of evidence of predisposition ,
established entrapment as a matter of law under the existing two-part
test. It was not necessary for the court to expand the entrapment defense,
nor is there language in the opinion indicating that it did 50 . 28

Fair enough, the court could not find that Jacobson had expressly changed
the subjective test. Hence, the court was unwilling to direct trial judges to
look to the' 'positional" approach.
The entrapment jurisprudence in the Ninth Circuit though, does not end
there. Less than one year later, the judges were again faced with a difficult
undercover investigation, in United States v. Martinez .29 While the court
would not explicitly follow the Seventh Circuit lead, it reversed the narcotics conviction and found entrapment as a matter of law. It reached this
conclusion by scrutinizing very closely the activities of the government in
soliciting the crime, and also the evidence relating to the defendant's prior
intent to commit the offense. As to the former; the record showed that a
mutual friend had introduced the defendant to a paid police informant and
the informant had a series of contacts with the defendant for more than two
months, effectively "wooing" the defendant. 80 According to the court, the
informant made a fine living from his activities: $500 per week to uncover
Questions well asked- and answered-in Hollingsworth . 27 F.3d at 1202.
A Fifth Circuit panel did in United States v. Knox, 112 F.3d 802,808 (5th CiI.
1997) and it was reversed en bane, United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247 (5th Cir.
1998) [en bane]. In Brace, the majority of the circuit found that the "positional
readiness " view of the panel had not been properly raised by the parties in the appeal and thus the court would " not address issues not presented to us." Id. at 26061 . The court did write that "the law of our circuit is at least arguably contra" to the
holding in Hollingsworth. Id. at 260.
26 United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997).
29 122 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1997).
30 rd. at 1164.
26

27
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drug dealers, plus $3000-$4000 per arrest. 3l Regarding the latter concern,
the prosecution offered little to support the view that the defendant was
predisposed to commit the drug offense.32
The dissenter in Martinez complained that the majority was placing too
much emphasis on the actions of the informant: " [I]t is not the degree of
government participation that is critical but, rather, the predisposition of the
defendant." 33 For him, the agent's " inappropriate conduct [was] beside the
point."34 He had a point. To be sure, the federal courts utilize the subjective
view of the entrapment defense, not the objective view; as such- at least
traditionally- they are supposed to review mainly the defendant's state of
mind, not the government's conduct. The majority, though eschewing the
Seventh Circuit approach, emphasized heavily the nature of the inducement
and, quoting an earlier Supreme Court opinion,35 decided that the solicitation
was inappropriate and that the defendant had been entrapped. "[The
informant] played on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiled him
into committing crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted.' '36
Moreover, while the decision did not even cite Judge Posner's broad
reading of the Court's opinion, it quoted Jacobson and reiterated that the
causal link was essential to the government's case in resisting the entrapment defense. "[The informant's inducement] led to the apprehension of an
otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would
have never run afoul of the law. ' '37
I believe the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have applied the Supreme Court
entrapment precedent just right. Whether one labels it a causal link determination (Ninth Circuit), or a positional approach (Seventh Circuit), the results
in both of these cases are correct, and wholly consistent with Jacobson. 38 By
weighing heavily the activities of the government agent, as well as looking
Tax free . . . . Id. at 1163.
The government offered no evidence to rebut the defendant's testimony of his
reluctance. ld. at 1164.
331d.atI167.
S4 Id.
3G Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S . 369, 376 (1958).
38 122 F.3d at 1166.
3 7 Id.
38 These two circuits have not been the only courts to shift direction in light of
Jacobson . The court in United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998)albeit in a case involving the trial judge's refusal to instruct on entrapment- weighed
heavily the nature of the government action.
31
32

Gamache initially expressed only his desire for a sexual relationship with Frances and
his intent to form a non-sexual relationship with her children. [n addition, the agent here
manufactured the aura of a personal relationship between Gamache and the fictional
"Frances," and "Frances" disclosed her fictional illicit intentions only well into the correspondence. These solicitations are quite similar to the type of "psychologically
graduated" responses that the Jacobson Court found objectionable. Second, the government agent provided j ustifications for the illicit activity (intergenerational sex) by describing "herself' as glad that Gamache was " liberal" like her, expres ing that she, as the
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to the evidence of prior criminal behavior by the accused, a court can
properly determine if this person likely would have committed this crime
without the government involvement. 3D If we are left with some doubt as to
such probable behavior, entrapment as a matter of law should be found. 40
With this approach to undercover investigations and the defendant's affirmative defense in the criminal trial, judges are able to balance the needs of
the government to investigate crimes with the individual's right not to be
persuaded to take actions which she otherwise would not have taken.41 After
all, agents could still engage in serious undercover operations. Of course, the
suggested approach of looking closely to the probability of the defendant
acting on her own without government inducement would encourage trial
judges more often to find the defense as a matter oflaw. The result, however,
is to restore the entrapment defense to an appropriate position in such
prosecutions. The government will undoubtedly continue to conduct wide
mother of the children, strongly approved of the illegal activity, and explaining that she
had engaged in this conduct as a child and found it beneficial to her. These solicitations
suggested that Gamache ought to be allowed to engage in the illicit activity, just as the
Government in Jacobson used a fake lobbying organization to appeal to anti-censorship
motives. Finally, the Government's sting commenced in May 1995 and did not result in
any illegal conduct until January 1996. Thus, the Government persevered for almost seven
months to elicit the offense conduct.

[d. at It. In addition, the prosecution had argued that an "enthusiastic response"
was sufficient to defeat the entrapment claim. Citing Hollingsworth , the court wrote
that such a response "although clearly relevant to the jury's inquiry, is not sufficient
by itself to mandate a finding that he was predisposed." Id. at 12.
39 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Martinez well makes the point. By reviewing
with care the government's actions, the evidence as to pre-disposition becomes
clearer.
Plancarte spent more than two months wooing Martinez. According to Martinez's uncontradicted testimony, Plancarte cajoled, scolded, and pressured Martinez throughout
this time. Among other tactics, Plancarte reassured Martinez not to worry about the police,
attempted to teach Martinez about the drug trade, scolded Martinez because he didn't
know how to sell drugs, and was "always instructing" him about the drug trade. Eventually, Plancarte attempted to sway Martinez with promises of wealth and friendship. Martinez finally gave in shortly after Plancarte promised to become his' 'padrino." Thus, the
undisputed evidence shows that Plancarte went to great lengths to lure Martinez with pressure tactics, suggestions and promises of companionship, wealth, friendship, and an
important symbolic relationship.
In addition, there was strong circumstantial support for the inference that Plancarte was
inappropriately aggressive in inducing Martinez.

122 F.3d at 1164-65.
40 If there is a reasonable doubt as to predisposition, the defendant must prevail.
See Gamache, supra, 156 F.3d at 9; United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1504
(8th Cir. 1996).
41 As stated by Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Sherman, supra, 356 U.S. at
383: "No matter what the defendant's past record and present inclinations to
criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain
police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced
society. "
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ranging investigations, a judicially approved practice.42 What the proposed
approach will not permit routinely are dubious practices such as engaging in
tremendously long term investigations,4s giving great sums of money to
engage in relatively minor criminal acts,.4 or creating specially tailored
incentives based upon particular interests of the defendant such as appearing
in the movies or even receiving free vacations. 45

An Alternative?
Reliance on the entrapment defense 46 is not the only way the criminal
justice system could respond to concerns as to questionable investigations.47
One could find that undue government actions are invalid under the Due Process Clause. Such an approach, alas, is highly problematic.
In theory, the due process analysis seems ideal, for it is considered apart
from the entrapment defense.48 Moreover, the courts as a matter of constitutional construction could limit over-involvement oflaw enforcement in criminal activity. Also, the doctrine has a powerful heritage looking to the searchand-seizure opinion of Justice Frankfurter in the famous stomach pumping
case, Rochin v. California. 49 In the entrapment setting, however, the doctrine
has not fared nearly as well.
42 This oft-repeated statement was made by then-Justice Rehnquist in United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973):

The illicit manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident, but a
continuing, though illegal, business enterprise. In order to obtain convictions for illegally
manufacturing drugs, the gathering of evidence of past unlawful conduct frequently proves
to be an all but impossible task. Thus in drug-related offenses law enforcement personnel
have turned to one of the only practicable means of detection: the infiltration of drug rings
and a limited participation in their unlawful present practices. Such infiltration is a
recognized and permissible means of investigation. . . .

Almost two and one-half years in Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550.
As in Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200-1201.
45 Actual enticements in some of the prosecuted, but unreported cases. See supra
notes 9 and 10.
46 A limited reliance, as the Chief Justice has stated succinctly: " But the defense
of entrapment .. . was not intended to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's
foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which it did not approve." Russell,
supra, 411 U.S. at 435.
47 In a case in which a young now-Vice President AI Gore was involved as a
reporter, the defense counsel in closing argument referred to the sting operation
there as " the meanest, vilest, sneakiest method of law enforcement." The jury
fou nd the defendant not guilty. Maraniss, " As a Reporter, Gore Found A Reason to
be in Politics," Washington Post A-I, January 4, 1998.
48 One can be predisposed and contin ue to raise the constitutional claim. See
Commonwealth v. Monteagudo, 693 N.E.2d 1381 (Mass. 1998).
49 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The Court there reversed a conviction after the police had
directed a medical pumping of the defendant' s stomach in order to obtain incriminating evidence (the defendant had swallowed pills).
43
44
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The due process approach in the area was first mentioned, in dictum, by
then-Justice Rehnquist in 1973 when he commented that the Court "may
some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely
bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction."60 From that promising beginning, however, the doctrine has
seen much resistance and limited application. Few federal courts have actually struck down convictions on this basis.51 Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist
himself retreated from the notion that due process could even form the
basis-apart from the entrapment doctrine-for voiding a conviction, 52 and
some judges today question whether the due process claims still exists. 53
Most courts do recognize the doctrine,54 but at the same time find it to be
very limited in application. M Judges have not been sufficiently outraged, for
the purpose of utilizing either the entrapment or the due process analysis,
even when faced with quite extreme behavior. Courts have refused to act in
egregious cases ranging from sexual contact by government agents,56 to the
purchase/sale of illegal drug or drug components, 57 or even to the involvement of police in the production of bombs. 68 Looking in this area to the Due
Process Clause for protection against overzealous law enforcement behavior
is likely to leave one disappointed. 59
United States v. Russell , 411 U.S. 423, 431 (1973).
State judges have been more inclined to apply the doctrine in favor of the
defense. See Marcus, supra note 3, at § 7.05 .
52 Along with two other Justices, in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484
(1976).
53 The leading critic of the doctrine is probably Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh
Circuit. See hi s forceful concurring opinion in United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d
1265, 1271 - 73 (7th Cir. 1989), and the author's response in Marcus, "The Due Process Defense in Entrapment Cases: The Journey Back," 27 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 457,
465- 66 (1990).
64 See, e.g., United States v. Gell-lren, 146 F .3d 827, 831 (lOth Cir. 1998); United
States v. Franco, 136 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Carter, 966 F.
Supp. 336, 343 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
65 The standard is whether the law enforcement action is "shocking, outrageous,
and clearly intolerable." United States v. No lan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 , 231 (3rd
Cir. 1998). The defense "is available only where the government ' is so involved in
the criminal endeavor that it shocks our sense of justice.'" Franco, supra, 136 F.3d
at 629, or when the govern ment engages in " the use of extreme, conscienceshocking physical or psychological coercion . . . . [A]nd time has shown that the
judicial conscience is sturdy." Labensky v. County of Nassau, 6 F. Supp. 2d 161 ,
171,173 (B.D.N.Y. 1998).
58 Nolan-Cooper, supra; Gamache, supra.
57 Hampton , supra; United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3 d 1410 (lith Cir. 1998).
58 United States v. Nunez, 146 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1998).
59 See generally, Lord, supra note II, 25 Fla. St. U. Rev. at 504-13. This due process approach, of course, is not the only alternative. Some have suggested various
50

51
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Conclusion
Balancing the need to engage in undercover operations against interests
of individual liberty will always be difficult. After Jacobson courts are justifiably promoting a more careful review of both government inducement and
lack of evidence of predisposition so as to determine if the defendant would
have committed the criminal act without law enforcement encouragement.
Surely, this must be the lesson from Jacobson itself. There, the Eighth Circuit
en banc discussed at length the contention that Due Process had been violated
by the postal inspectors' operation, but spent little time looking to the danger
actually posed by this offender.GO The Supreme Court, however, did not mention Due Process and instead found entrapment as a matter of law after
chastising the postal service investigators for their intense involvement with
the defendant. 61
We are, then, left with the advice of the United States Supreme Court to
avoid the constitutional ground and to advance more intense judicial scrutiny
of the government in the entrapment context. Such an evidentiary approach
will have a positive impact by concentrating attention on both the role of the
government in investigating crime, and the relationship of law enforcement
activity to the ultimate commission of crime. In increasing numbers, judges
are following this advice by asking whether, without government involvement, the defendant likely would have committed the charged crime.
Certainly, for all concerned, that is the appropriate question to ask and
answer.
forms of judicial consideration of individualized suspicion before government
undercover operations could commence. The courts have been singularly unenthusiastic about such a course. But see, Siobogin, " Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery:
Investigative Lies By the Police," 76 Oregon L. Rev. 775, 805- 808 ( 1997); Mosteller, "Moderating Investigative Lies By Di sc losure and Documentation," 76
Oregon L. Rev. 833, 839 (1997).
60 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), overruled, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
61 See discussion in text accompanying notes 13- 19, supra.
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